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The 21st century has ushered in an era of philanthropic globalization marked by a 
significant rise in international charitable giving. At the same time, cross-border 
philanthropy has raised legitimate fiscal and regulatory concerns for government. To 
understand how donor countries have responded to this changed global philanthropic 
landscape, we use comparative tax methodology to develop a spectrum of approaches 
to the tax treatment of cross-border giving and apply tax policy criteria to critically 
evaluate the divergent approaches of Australia and the Netherlands, located at opposing 
ends of the spectrum. Findings from the comparative analysis reveal that in the current 
global environment for philanthropy there is a strong case to be made for allowing tax 
deductible donations to cross borders. 
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Almost every member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Development Assistance Committee 
(“DAC”)1 has tax incentives to encourage domestic philanthropy. These 
tax incentives, typically in the form of a tax deduction or tax credit, have 
1. The DAC of the OECD is an international forum of the major countries 
that provide aid, online: OECD <www.oecd.org/dac/>.
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the potential to lower the price of giving, increasing both the amount 
donated to nonprofit organizations2 and the number of donors.3 Until 
quite recently, these tax incentives generally did not extend to cross-
border philanthropy4 notwithstanding their significance for nonprofits 
engaged in international charitable activities. The transformation of the 
global philanthropic landscape in the 21st century, marked by a rise in 
both the amount of international giving and the form that giving takes,5 
has forced donor countries to consider the provision of tax incentives for 
cross-border donations. As national boundaries around philanthropy have 
started to blur, governments are struggling to maintain an appropriate 
balance between protecting the interests of the fiscal state (including the 
2. The term ‘nonprofit organization’ (“NPO”) will be used throughout 
this paper to refer to ‘not-for-profit organization’, ‘non-governmental 
organization’ (“NGO”) and ‘charities’ (a subset of NPOs that have been 
acknowledged by the state as meeting either the common law or statutory 
definition of charity depending on the jurisdiction). 
3. See e.g. John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, “The Federal Tax 
Treatment of Charitable Organisations” in Walter Powell & Richard 
Steinberg, eds, The Non Profit Sector: A Research Handbook, 2d (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) 267 at 272; Joseph Cordes, “Re-
Thinking the Deduction for Charitable Contributions: Evaluating the 
Effects of Deficit-Reduction Proposals” (2011) 64:4 National Tax Journal 
1001 at 1003; Charles Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) at 281; Roger Colinvaux, 
Brian Galle & Eugene Steuerle, Evaluating the Charitable Deduction and 
Proposed Reforms (Washington: The Urban Institute, 2012) at 9. 
4. Defined as a charitable gift from a donor in one jurisdiction to a recipient 
in another. This term will be used throughout this article interchangeably 
with ‘international philanthropy’ and ‘international giving’.
5. In the two decades from 1997 to 2017, private philanthropic flows for 
development grew from approximately USD $7.1 billion to USD $40.9 
billion. See “Grants by Private Agencies and NGOs” (2019), online: 
OECD <data.oecd.org/drf/grants-by-private-agencies-and-ngos.htm> 
DOI: <10.1787/a42ccf0e-en>. The Hudson Institute estimates that in 
2014 private philanthropy from DAC donors to developing countries 
was as high as USD $63.7 billion. See Center for Global Prosperity, The 
Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2016 (Washington: Hudson 
Institute, 2016) at 6.
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potential for international giving like other cross-border transactions 
to be misused for the purposes of terrorism and money laundering),6 
while enabling their citizens to effectively contribute to philanthropy’s 
globalization.
The situation in the European Union is illustrative. For Member 
States, the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU (“TFEU”) have caused a changed regional philanthropic 
environment by mandating non-discrimination of charities and their 
donors.7 The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has interpreted this 
principle of non-discrimination to require that Member States provide 
the same tax concessions to equivalent charities resident in other Member 
States that they provide to qualifying domestic charities.8 In practice 
however, implementation by Member States differs due to domestic 
fiscal policy, with the result that “the fiscal environment for cross-border 
philanthropy, even within the EU, is still rather complex”.9 Despite 
6. See Victoria Bjorkland, Jenni Reynoso & Abbey Hazlett, “Terrorism 
and Money Laundering: Illegal Purposes and Activities” (2004-2005) 
25:2 Pace Law Review 233 at 233; Christopher Groves & Alana Lowe-
Petraske, “The Practice of International Philanthropy” in Clive Cutbill, 
Alison Paines & Murray Hallam, eds, International Charitable Giving 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 3, 4, 13-4; Douglas Rutzen, 
“Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic Protectionism” (2015) 17:1 
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 5 at 18-19; Rebecca Vernon, 
“Closing the Door on Aid” (2009) 11:4 International Journal of Not-for-
Profit Law 5 at 17-19.
7. “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union” (1 March 2020), EUR-Lex, online: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02016E/TXT-20200301> [TFEU].
8. See Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v Finanzamt München für 
Körperschaften, C–386/04, [2006] ECR I–8203 at I–8234 [Centro di 
Musicologia]; Hein Persche v Finanzamt Lüdenscheid, C–318/07, [2009] 
ECR at I–359 [Hein Persche]; Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach eV v 
Belgium, C–25/10, [2011] ECR at I–497 [Missionswerk]; European 
Commission v Republic of Austria, C–10/10, [2011] ECR at I–05389 
[Republic of Austria].
9. Hanna Surmatz & Ludwig Forrest, “Boosting Cross-Border Philanthropy 
in Europe: Towards a Tax-Effective Environment” (Brussels: European 
Foundation Centre, 2017) at 4.
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the current complexity of cross-border giving, the issue remains topical 
within the EU. It is expected that under the Romanian presidency of 
the EU, resolving the barriers to cross-border giving will be included on 
the political agenda.10 As the philanthropic sector in Europe continues 
to strive for a tax-effective environment for ‘European’ cross-border 
donations,11 changes in government policy affecting the tax treatment of 
international giving are taking place elsewhere.12 
The transformation of the global philanthropic landscape has 
prompted tax scholars from around the world to examine this domestic 
tax issue from a comparative perspective to understand how countries 
have responded to the challenges and opportunities presented by 
10. See European Economic and Social Committee, “European Philanthropy: 
An Untapped Potential (Exploratory Opinion at the Request of the 




11. See Surmatz & Forrest, supra note 9. See also European Foundation 
Centre and Donors and Foundations Networks in Europe, “European 
Philanthropy Manifesto” (Brussels: European Foundation Centre, 2019), 
online (pdf ): Philanthropy Advocacy <philanthropyadvocacy.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/20190321-Philanthropy-Manifesto_420x210_
WEB.pdf>.
12. See e.g. Australia where the Australian Taxation Office recently issued 
a new public ruling reflecting a more permissive approach to the tax 
treatment of cross-border donations. Australian Taxation Office, Taxation 
Ruling TR 2019/6, “Income Tax: The ‘in Australia’ Requirement for 
Certain Deductible Gift Recipients and Income Tax Exempt Entities” 
(2019) online: <www.ato.gov.au/law/view/document?docid=TXR/
TR20196/NAT/ATO/00001> [TR 2019/6]. 
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the globalization of philanthropy.13 This article builds on the existing 
scholarship by employing comparative tax methodology and utilizing 
a technique of actual comparison that can be used by policy-makers 
13. See e.g. Ineke Koele, International Taxation of Philanthropy: Removing Tax 
Obstacles for International Charities (Amsterdam: International Bureau 
of Fiscal Documentation, 2007); Sigrid Hemels, “Are We In Need of 
a European Charity? How to Remove Fiscal Barriers to Cross-Border 
Charitable Giving in Europe” (2009) 37:8 Intertax 424; Theodore 
Georgopoulos, “Can Tax Authorities Scrutinise the Ideas of Foreign 
Charities? The ECJ’s Persche Judgment and Lessons from US Tax Law” 
(2010) 16:4 European Law Journal 458; Charles Ostertag, “We’re Starting 
to Share Well With Others: Cross-Border Giving Lessons from the 
Court of Justice of the European Union” (2011) 20:1 Tulane Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 255; Sabine Heidenbauer, Charity 
Crossing Borders: The Fundamental Freedoms’ Impact on Charity and Donor 
Taxation in Europe (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 
2011); David Moore & Douglas Rutzen, “Legal Framework for Global 
Philanthropy: Barriers and Opportunities” (2011) 13:1-2 International 
Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 5; Heike Jochum, “Cross-Border Charitable 
and Other Pro Bono Contributions: The Situation in Europe and the 
US” (2012) 40:11 Intertax 593; Sabine Heidenbauer et al, “Cross-Border 
Charitable Giving and its Tax Limitations” (2013) 67:11 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 611; Clive Cutbill, Alison Paines & Murray 
Hallam, eds, International Charitable Giving (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Thomas von Hippel, Taxation of Cross-Border Philanthropy 
in Europe After Persche and Stauffer: From Landlock to Free Movement? 
(Brussels: European Foundation Center, 2014); Lilian Faulhaber, 
“Charitable Giving, Tax Expenditures, and Direct Spending in the United 
States and the European Union” (2014) 39:1 Yale Journal of International 
Law 87; Miranda Stewart, “The Boundaries of Charities and Tax” in 
Matthew Harding, Ann O’Connell & Miranda Stewart, eds, Not-for-Profit 
Law: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) 232; Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Julie-Anne 
Tarr & Natalie Silver, “The Fisc and the Frontier: Approaches to Cross-
Border Philanthropy in Australia and the UK” (2015) 26:4, online: The 
Philanthropist < thephilanthropist.ca/2015/05/the-fisc-and-the-frontier-
approaches-to-cross-border-charity-in-australia-and-the-uk/>; Renate 
Buijze, “Tax Incentives Crossing Borders: Considering the Example of Tax 
Incentives for Charitable Giving” in Sigrid Hemels & Kazuko Goto, eds, 
Tax Incentives for the Creative Industries (Singapore: Springer, 2017).
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seeking to reform their tax treatment of cross-border donations. Applying 
comparative tax methodology to this discrete tax issue enables national 
tax laws and policies affecting cross-border giving to be considered 
beyond domestic tax policy-making concerns, to take into account the 
international realities of philanthropic globalization.
Part II of the article discusses comparative tax methodology and 
its application to the tax incentives for international giving. Part III 
adopts a functionalist approach to jurisdictional selection by examining 
‘comparable’ jurisdictions that are all members of the OECD group of 
DAC donor countries. The results of this comparison are then used to 
develop a spectrum of approaches to the tax treatment of cross-border 
donations. At one end of the spectrum are countries that have employed 
domestic tax policy to place geographic barriers around charitable tax 
relief for donors; at the other end are countries that have adopted a more 
permissive approach to the provision of tax incentives for international 
giving. Part IV evaluates the two countries located at opposing ends of 
the spectrum — Australia and the Netherlands — using traditional tax 
policy considerations of equity, efficiency, simplicity, policy consistency 
and sustainability. Comparing these two divergent approaches utilizing a 
clear tax policy assessment framework points to an optimal approach for 
addressing this discrete tax issue. Part V offers concluding thoughts on 
how the comparative analysis can inform governments seeking to reform 
their tax incentives for cross-border philanthropy. 
II. Comparative Tax Methodology And Its 
Application To The Tax Treatment Of Cross-
Border Donations
Comparative tax methodology, or comparative tax law, is the 
“application of ‘comparative law’ methodologies to the study of tax 
laws”.14 Comparative tax law takes a country comparison beyond parallel 
descriptions of domestic tax laws in multiple jurisdictions. It provides a 
critical evaluation of those rules within the legal systems in which they 
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operate in order to develop an appropriate policy framework for reform.15 
In doing so, it provides new insights that can only be achieved by way of 
comparison, adding to the body of comparative tax knowledge.16 
We employ a functional approach, which rests on the assumption 
that “the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems 
and solves these problems by quite different means though very often 
with similar results”.17 Because functionalists see the convergence of 
legal systems as desirable, their approach to jurisdictional selection is 
to examine ‘comparable’ jurisdictions, which are typically at a similar 
evolutionary stage and therefore likely to face similar problems.18 This 
provides a functional equivalence, a ‘similarity in difference’ that facilitates 
the comparative analysis.19 While other comparative approaches have 
been applied to tax law, the functional approach has been found to be 
particularly suited to comparative taxation because it is able to overcome 
the obstacles to comparing tax rules “posed by rapid legislative change, 
complexity of tax systems and the heterogeneity of local tax concepts [by 
looking] at the functions of tax rules in different domestic systems as they 
evolve over time”.20 The normative goal of the tax functionalist is the 
harmonization of tax laws for similarly situated jurisdictions.21 
For the practical application of this approach, we adopt a comparative 
technique that incorporates Walter Kamba’s three phases of comparative 
legal analysis.22 In the first ‘descriptive’ phase, the “norms, concepts and 
institutions of the systems concerned” are described in their local context.23 
In the second ‘identification’ phase, the systems are compared in an effort 
to identify “divergences and resemblances between the legal systems or 
15. See Carlo Garbarino, “An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative 
Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research” (2009) 57:3 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 677 at 685. 
16. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Nicola Sartori & Omri Marian, “Some Theoretical 
Aspects of ‘Comparative Taxation’” in Reuven Avi-Yonah, Nicola Sartori 
& Omri Marian, eds, Global Perspectives on Income Tax Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) at 1.
22. See Walter Kamba, “Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework” (1974) 
23:3 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 485 at 511.
23. Ibid.
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parts of the legal systems compared”.24 In the third ‘explanatory’ phase, 
the results of the analysis are critically evaluated and the divergences 
and resemblances explained.25 The results from the descriptive and 
identification phases are used to develop a spectrum of approaches to the 
tax treatment of cross-border donations in order to understand where 
each country is located globally on this issue. We then take these findings 
to critically evaluate the divergent approaches of the countries that appear 
at opposing ends of the cross-border giving spectrum to determine which 
approach is optimal. In doing so, we employ tax policy criteria used to 
reform national tax laws, providing a clear assessment framework that 
overcomes the evaluation shortcomings that have been associated with 
equivalence functionalism.26
Comparative tax methodology was first used to address the tax 
treatment of cross-border donations by Anthony Infanti, an American 
tax and comparative law scholar, who used the rules governing the United 
States tax treatment of cross-border donations to test his own comparative 
tax framework of ‘spontaneous tax coordination’.27 Infanti argued that 
this topic was particularly suited to comparative tax methodology because 
it contained distinct legal rules that cross borders, implicating other 
countries and their international tax regimes.28 As a critical legal scholar, 
Infanti acknowledged that his primary reason for choosing this topic was 
because “it was not a topic about which academics studying international 
tax normally write”.29 More than a decade later, the transformation of the 
global philanthropic landscape has prompted other tax scholars around 
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid at 511-12.
26. See Michaels, supra note 17 at 373-76 for a discussion of these 
limitations.
27. See Anthony Infanti, “Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On Adopting a 
Comparative Approach to Reforming the US International Tax Regime” 
(2002) 35:4 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1105 [Infanti, 
“Spontaneous Tax Coordination”].
28. Ibid at 1120. 
29. See Anthony Infanti, “A Tax Crit Identity Crisis? Or Tax Expenditure 
Analysis, Deconstruction, and the Rethinking of a Collective Identity” 
(2005) 26:2 Whittier Law Review 707 at 796.
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the world to address the comparative tax treatment of cross-border 
donations.30 
Infanti’s comparative tax framework involved “unilateral action on 
the part of [a country seeking to reform its tax system by] reviewing 
and evaluating the international tax rules adopted by other countries” in 
order to understand and accommodate legislative solutions and trends.31 
He defined tax coordination broadly as “the adaptation of one country’s 
tax system to that of another”32 in order to “imbue the framework with 
a great deal of flexibility and allow policy-makers to vary the desired 
level of coordination as necessary to accommodate domestic political, 
economic and social norms”.33 For the practical application of his 
framework Infanti followed Kamba’s three phases of comparative legal 
analysis, emphasizing the descriptive phase where he compared a broad 
cross-section of countries representing “each of the eight families of 
income tax laws”.34 After identifying similarities and differences, Infanti 
briefly evaluated the findings “to determine the most ‘appropriate’ rule 
by balancing the benefits of the superior rule against all of the relevant 
theoretical and practical considerations that normally inform US 
international tax policy-making”.35 
Our comparative technique differs from Infanti’s in three significant 
ways. First, rather than looking at a broad range of countries, we adopt 
a functional approach to jurisdictional selection by comparing OECD 
DAC donor countries at similar stages of legal development. Second, 
we create a spectrum of approaches to identify where each country is 
located in terms of the extent to which tax incentives for international 
giving are permitted or restricted. Third, we undertake an in-depth 
analysis of the two countries at opposing ends of the spectrum using 
tax policy considerations that inform policy-making across jurisdictions. 
Narrowing the analysis to the two extremes on the spectrum, rather than 
30. See supra note 13. 
31. See Infanti, “Spontaneous Tax Coordination”, supra note 27 at 1136.
32. Ibid at 1128.
33. Ibid at 1142.
34. Ibid at 1159.
35. Ibid at 1226.
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drawing from all of the countries in the initial comparison, achieves 
a comparative clarity that assists in ascertaining the optimal approach 
to the tax treatment of cross-border donations. Employing traditional 
tax policy considerations provides a clear assessment framework for 
evaluating the two divergent approaches. 
III. Developing A Spectrum Of Approaches To The 
Tax Treatment Of Cross-Border Donations
We have undertaken a functional comparison of 11 jurisdictions based 
on our earlier comparative research to assess how these jurisdictions 
have responded to philanthropic globalization through the provision 
of tax incentives for international giving.36 This comparative research 
examined the tax laws and policies governing cross-border philanthropy 
in the ‘comparable’ jurisdictions of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, the United 
Kingdom and the US. These countries are all present members of the 
OECD DAC and as such are all considered developed nations with high 
income and the most significant providers of cross-border development 
36. See Natalie Silver, Beyond the Water’s Edge: Re-thinking the Tax Treatment 
of Australian Cross-Border Donations (DPhil Thesis, Queensland University 
of Technology, 2016); Renate Buijze, Philanthropy for the Arts in the Era 
of Globalisation: International Tax Barriers for Charitable Giving (DPhil 
Thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2017). Materials concerning the 
mentioned countries have been included up to June 7, 2017. Since then, 
the position of France on the spectrum has changed and moved more 
towards the permissive side of the spectrum, see Isabel Heuzé, “Legaat van 
een Inwoner van Frankrijk aan een Nederlandse ‘ANBI’: Vrijstelling van 
Franse Erfbelasting” (“Legacy from an Inhabitant of France to a Dutch 
‘ANBI’: Exemption from French Inheritance Tax”) (2018) 10 Fiscaal 
Tijdschrift Vermogen 6 (translation by the authors). As soon as the United 
Kingdom leaves the EU, it becomes a third country and it no longer has 
to comply with EU law. The UK then thus no longer has to grant the 
same tax benefits on donations to domestic Public Benefit Organizations 
(“PBOs”) as on donations to comparable PBOs located in other EU 
Member States, which might influence its position on the spectrum. 
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aid.37 They also share similarities in their approach to civil society 
regulation and are at a similar level of evolutionary legal development. We 
compared the country approaches thematically to identify similarities and 
differences. This analysis revealed that while there is policy consistency 
across these jurisdictions in encouraging domestic giving through the tax 
laws, this is not the case with cross-border giving. 
The countries examined evidence a broad range of approaches to the 
provision of tax incentives for international philanthropy. At one end of 
the spectrum are countries that have used domestic tax policy to place 
geographic barriers around charitable tax concessions, including Australia 
and Japan, whereby tax incentives for charitable giving generally stop at a 
country’s borders. At the other end are countries that have adopted a more 
permissive approach to the provision of tax incentives for international 
philanthropy, including Luxembourg and the Netherlands, allowing 
tax deductible donations to cross borders. These research findings are 
illustrated on a spectrum from most restrictive to least restrictive tax 
treatment tax treatment in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Spectrum of approaches to tax treatment of cross-border donations
It is notable that with the exception of Spain and the UK, all other 
EU Member States appear on the permissive end of the spectrum. This 
is a result of Member States amending their tax laws in response to a 
combination of infringement procedures by the European Commission 
and decisions by the ECJ. The European Commission aimed to achieve 
non-discrimination of charities and their donors within the EU, in 
compliance with the four fundamental freedoms stipulated in the TFEU. 
37. “Development Assistance Committee (DAC)” (2019), online: OECD 
<www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm#members>. In addition to 
development aid, this article also includes other types of charitable giving 
for the public benefit.
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In four landmark cases dealing with the tax treatment of charities, the 
ECJ developed a general non-discrimination principle according to 
which a Member State must grant the same beneficial tax treatment to 
an equivalent charity resident in another Member State as it provides 
to a domestic charity.38 Both the ECJ case law and the infringement 
procedures by the European Commission reflect a permissive approach 
towards ‘European’ cross-border charity and philanthropy. While 
Member States retain the right to decide whether they want to provide 
tax incentives and under what conditions, a residency requirement is 
prohibited. The result is that once a Member State decides to provide 
favourable tax treatment to domestic charities and their donors it must 
also provide non-discriminatory tax treatment to comparable charities 
located in other Member States.39 
The majority of Member States have amended their tax laws in 
accordance with the non-discrimination principle established by the ECJ. 
Of the Member States examined, only Spain’s tax legislation does not 
conform with this principle.40 This explains Spain’s location towards the 
restrictive end of the spectrum. The UK has amended its tax legislation 
in accordance with the non-discrimination principle, however its 
approach is moderately restrictive as a result of tax legislation containing 
jurisdiction, registration and management requirements, which serve to 
limit access to UK charitable status and tax relief for non-UK charities.41 It 
also provides that UK charities submit to a reasonableness determination 
by the UK tax authority, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, prior to 
sending charitable funds outside the UK. While other Member States 
have adopted more permissive approaches than Spain and the UK, the 
Netherlands is the only European jurisdiction examined that has extended 
the principle of non-discrimination to countries beyond the EU, which 
locates it at the most permissive end of the spectrum.
In contrast, Australia, Canada, Japan and the US all appear at the 
restrictive end of the spectrum because the tax legislation in these countries 
contain ‘in country’ residency requirements that requires a charity to 
be resident or established in the home country to access charitable tax 
concessions. The result is that in these jurisdictions there are no tax 
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incentives for donations made directly to foreign charities.42 Canada, 
Japan and the US permit a tax deduction for cross-border donations 
made indirectly through domestic charities for their own charitable 
work abroad or by serving as a charitable intermediary, provided that the 
domestic charity maintains discretion and control over the funds and is 
not serving as a mere conduit for channeling the funds abroad. Australia 
appears at the most restrictive end of the spectrum because unlike 
Canada, Japan and the US, it generally does not permit a tax deduction 
for cross-border donations made indirectly through domestic charities.43 
This analysis locates Australia and the Netherlands at opposing ends 
of the spectrum for the tax treatment of cross-border donations. The 
Australian Government responded to philanthropic globalization and 
domestic fiscal pressures by restricting tax incentives for cross-border 
giving, while the Netherlands adopted a permissive, internationalist 
approach by applying the same tax treatment to domestic and cross-
border donations. Given their divergent approaches, these two countries 
provide an important basis for comparison.
IV. Evaluating The Divergent Approaches Using Tax 
Policy Considerations 
This section provides a descriptive analysis of Australia and the 
Netherlands’ legal regime governing the tax treatment of cross-border 
giving and identifies the similarities and differences between the two 
divergent approaches. These results are critically evaluated using tax policy 
considerations to determine the optimal approach for the provision of tax 
incentives for cross-border donations in a changed global philanthropic 
landscape. 
42. Although the US has tax treaties with three countries and Canada has 
one that all contain ‘mutual recognition’ provisions enabling cross-border 
reciprocity for charitable donations.
43. Other than exceptions for foreign aid organizations and certain 
environmental organizations.
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A. Descriptive Country Comparison
The descriptive country comparison considers each jurisdiction’s laws 
and policies governing the tax treatment of cross-border donations, 
taking into account the broader historical and cultural context in which 
their charitable tax regimes operate. Each country will be described 
under two main headings (i) tax incentives for cross-border donations 
and (ii) regulatory measures governing cross-border charitable activities. 
This facilitates the comparative analysis by providing a thematic basis 
for comparison, augmenting the functional equivalence of the two 
jurisdictions. 
1. Australia
Since colonial times, Australia has relied on the English common law 
model of charity, with churches and citizens being the primary drivers 
of voluntary sector activities and organizations.44 This colonial model of 
welfare provision combined private charity focused on domestic causes 
through the delivery of social services, with significant government 
subsidies to provide the basis for the new welfare state.45 Australia 
adopted the definition of charity enunciated in the seminal English case 
Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel,46 which defines 
charities as nonprofit organizations with charitable purposes that are for 
44. See Wendy Scaife et al, “Giving in Australia: Philanthropic Potential 
Beginning to Be Realized” in Pamala Wiepking & Femida Handy, 
eds, The Palgrave Handbook of Global Philanthropy (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015) 488.
45. See e.g. John Murphy, “The Other Welfare State: Non-Government 
Agencies and the Mixed Economy of Welfare in Australia” (2006) 3:2 
History Australia 44.1; Stephen Garton, Out of Luck: Poor Australians 
and Social Welfare 1788-1988 (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 
1990); Brian Dickey, No Charity There: A Short History of Social Welfare in 
Australia, 2d (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987); Mark Lyons, Third Sector: 
The Contribution of Nonprofit and Cooperative Enterprises in Australia 
(Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2001).
46. [1891] AC 531 (HL (Eng)).
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the public benefit.47 These colonial origins resulted in Australia adopting 
the English tradition of providing favourable tax treatment for domestic 
charities. A tax deduction for charitable gifts was enacted with the first 
Commonwealth legislation introducing personal income tax in 1915 and 
remains an important tax concession in Australia’s federal income tax 
system. 
i. Tax Incentives for Cross-Border Donations
The Australian Tax Office (“ATO”) is responsible for administering 
and enforcing tax law for nonprofits. Organizations must be endorsed 
by the ATO to access charitable tax concessions, including income tax 
exemption and deductible gift recipient (“DGR”) status. Having DGR 
status enables the organization to receive tax deductible donations. 
Australian residents can deduct from their taxable income the value of 
donations of AUD $2 or more made to a DGR.48 Australia’s tax legislation 
states that in order to obtain DGR status, the organization must be ‘in 
Australia’.49 The legislation does not provide a definition of ‘in Australia’. 
Instead, the ATO has issued tax rulings and guidance on its meaning. 
For the past 50 years, the ATO adopted a strict interpretation of this 
‘in Australia’ residency requirement, stipulating that a DGR must “be 
established, controlled, maintained and operated in Australia” and have 
“its benevolent purposes” in Australia.50 In practical terms this meant 
that donations by Australian taxpayers made directly to a charity outside 
Australia were never tax deductible. Donations made to an Australian 
DGR to use the gift for its own programs outside Australia were also not 
tax deductible, unless such activities were relatively minor or incidental 
47. Charities Act 2013 (Cth), 2013/100 (Austl), s 5.
48. Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), 1997/38 (Austl), s 30-15 [ITAA 
1997].
49. Ibid, s 30-125(1)(b)(iii).
50. Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Ruling TR 2003/5, “Income Tax 
and Fringe Benefits Tax: Public Benevolent Institutions” (4 June 2003) 
at para 129 [TR 2003/5]. For the origins of the ATO’s ‘in Australia’ 
interpretation and a critique see Natalie Silver, Myles McGregor-Lowndes 
& Julie-Anne Tarr, “Delineating the Fiscal Borders of Australia’s Non-
Profit Tax Concessions” (2016) 14:3 eJournal of Tax Research 741.
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to the organization’s Australian operations,51 or unless the organization 
obtained its DGR status pursuant to one of the limited exceptions to the 
‘in Australia’ residency requirement.52 While limited in number due to 
high entry barriers, organizations that have obtained DGR status pursuant 
to one of these exceptions have been used by Australian charities and their 
donors as giving intermediaries to channel tax deductible funds abroad.53 
These channelling arrangements, involving a servicing fee being paid to 
the intermediary DGR,54 have provided a workaround for organizations 
and their donors, enabling them to circumvent the restrictive tax laws in 
order to engage in tax-effective cross-border charitable activities.55 
Two significant judicial decisions in the last ten years have challenged 
the legislative efficacy of the geographic restrictions placed around gift 
deductibility and income tax exemption. In Federal Commissioner of 
51. TR 2003/5, ibid at para 130.
52. The exceptions are overseas aid funds, developed country disaster relief 
funds, public funds on the Register of Environmental Organisations and 
DGRs listed by name in the tax law. See ITAA 1997, supra note 48, ss 
30-55, 30-80, 30-85. For a detailed discussion of these exceptions, see 
Natalie Silver, Myles McGregor-Lowndes & Julie-Anne Tarr, “Should Tax 
Incentives for Charitable Giving Stop at Australia’s Borders?” (2016) 38:1 
Sydney Law Review 85 at 96-103. 
53. The Australian Bureau of Statistics Australian National Accounts: Non-
Profit Institutions Satellite Account 2012–13 found that ‘grants and other 
payments’ made by Australian nonprofit organizations to ‘non-resident 
organisations’ (defined as any organization domiciled overseas, including 
foreign branches and subsidiaries of Australian organizations) amounted 
to more than AUD $1 billion, highlighting the widespread use of 
domestic nonprofits for cross-border giving, a significant component 
of which is likely to be intermediary giving. See Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Australian National Accounts: Non-Profit Institutions Satellite 
Account, 2012–13 Catalogue No 5256.0 (Canberra: ABS, 28 August 
2015), online: Australian Bureau of Statistics <www.abs.gov.au/AusStats/
ABS@.nsf/MF/5256.0> [perma.cc/95RM-3TS2], table 10.1.
54. This servicing fee is typically 7-10 per cent of the amount distributed. See 
Letter from Philanthropy Australia to Prime Minister Tony Abbott (21 
April 2015) at 1. 
55. For further discussion on the use of such workarounds, see Silver, 
McGregor-Lowndes & Tarr, supra note 52 at 95, 103. 
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Taxation v Word Investments Ltd,56 the High Court of Australia found that 
it was permissible for a tax exempt entity to send funds abroad through a 
suitably qualified organization. This was affirmed in Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation v The Hunger Project Australia,57 where the Federal Court of 
Australia determined that Hunger Project Australia, which operated 
primarily as a fundraising arm for a global network of entities that 
provided hunger relief was eligible to apply for income tax exemption 
and DGR status. Following these decisions, the ATO’s longstanding 
restrictive position has shifted towards a more permissive approach to 
the tax treatment of cross-border donations, culminating in 2017 when 
the ATO withdrew its public ruling containing its strict interpretation of 
the ‘in Australia’ residency requirement.58 In doing so, the ATO cited a 
statement by the Commissioner of the Australian Charities and Not-for-
profits Commission (“ACNC”) that an organization “is not precluded 
from being registered as a [public benevolent institution] subtype of charity 
if it has a main purpose of providing benevolent relief to people residing 
overseas”.59 In March 2018, the ATO announced it was developing a new 
public ruling on the ‘in Australia’ residency requirement for deductible 
gift recipients and income tax exempt entities.60 This ruling was issued 
in December 2019.61 As the nonprofit sector awaited this new ruling, 
56. (2008) 236 CLR 204 (HCA) [Word Investments].
57. (2014) 221 FCR 302 (Austl) [Hunger Project].
58. Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Ruling TR 2003/5W, 
“Income Tax and Fringe Benefits Tax: Public Benevolent 
Institutions, Notice of Withdrawal” (17 May 2017) online: 
Australian Taxation Office <www.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.
htm?DocID=TXR%2FTR20035%2FNAT%2FATO%2F00001> [perma.
cc/J5VX-LJKS]. 
59. Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commissions, Commissioner’s 
Interpretation Statement: Public Benevolent Institutions, CIS 2016/03, 
(ACNC, 2016), s 5.8.
60. Australian Taxation Office, Advice Under Development – Income Tax 
Issues, [3911] “‘In Australia’ Requirement - Deductible Gift Recipients” 
(2018) online: Australian Taxation Office <www.ato.gov.au/General/ATO-
advice-and-guidance/Advice-under-development-program/Advice-under-
development---income-tax-issues/#BK_3911> [perma.cc/52YG-H4PV]. 
61. TR 2019/6, supra note 12.
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Australian organizations and their donors took advantage of the legal 
vacuum created by establishing organizations with DGR status that were 
able to send funds and engage in charitable activities outside Australia.
ii. Regulatory Measures Governing Cross-Border Charitable 
Activities
The ACNC was established in 2012 as Australia’s first national charity 
regulator.62 Registration of charities with the ACNC is voluntary, 
but is required for charities to access tax concessions, including 
obtaining DGR status, from the ATO.63 In order to register with the 
ACNC, an organization must meet the legal definition of charity, be 
in compliance with ACNC governance standards and have not been 
listed as an organization engaging in or supporting terrorist or other 
criminal activities.64 The registration process enables the ACNC to assess 
compliance risks against its governance standards. Once registered, the 
ACNC has a number of tools for the ongoing regulation of charities. All 
registered charities must keep certain financial and operational records 
for seven years explaining the charity’s financial position and activities.65 
The charity legislation also contains reporting requirements for registered 
charities (unless they are subject to an exception) through the submission 
of an annual information statement and financial reports, which requires 
some information on cross-border charitable activities.66 Failure to 
submit an annual information statement results in penalties67 and may 
result in revocation of registration. 
While the ACNC’s governance standards do not contain specific 
requirements for charities operating abroad, the charity legislation 
provides for external conduct standards to regulate registered charities 
62. The ACNC is governed by the Australian Australian Charities and Not-for-
profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth), 2012/16.
63. Ibid, s 10-5. 
64. Ibid, s 25-5.
65. Ibid, s 55-5. 
66. Ibid, s 60-5.
67. Ibid, s 175-35.
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sending funds or engaging in activities outside Australia.68 Until recently 
these external conduct standards had not been developed. Instead the 
ACNC issued guidance to assist charities working abroad to minimize 
the risk of being used for raising and distributing funds for terrorist 
financing.69 As part of a DGR reform package announced in December 
2017, the Australian Government stated its intention to issue the external 
conduct standards “[t]o strengthen oversight of overseas activities”.70 The 
external conduct standards came into effect in July 2019.71
In addition to regulation by the ACNC, charities are also subject to 
audits from the ATO, which can revoke DGR and tax exempt status and 
impose penalties for non-compliance. International aid organizations are 
subject to further regulation through the Overseas Aid Gift Deduction 
Scheme administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; 
and environmental organizations working abroad are also regulated 
through the Register for Environment Organisations, administered by 
the Department of the Environment.
2. The Netherlands
In the second half of the 19th century a differentiation of religious 
groups in the Netherlands took place, which led to Dutch society 
68. Ibid, div 50.
69. “Protecting Your Charity Against the Risk of Terrorism Financing” 
(2015), online: ACNC <www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/Manage/Protect/
ProtectingTF/ACNC/Edu/ProtectTF.aspx>; “Checklist: Protecting your 
Charity Against the Risk of Terrorism Financing” (2014), online: ACNC 
<www.acnc.gov.au/for-charities/manage-your-charity/checklist-protecting-
your-charity-against-risk-terrorism-financing>.
70. See Australian Treasury, Media Release, “Reforming Administration of Tax 
Deductible Gift Recipients”, (5 December 2017) online: Treasury Portfolio 
Ministers <ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/kelly-odwyer-2016/media-
releases/reforming-administration-tax-deductible-gift-recipients>.
71. See Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Amendment 2018 
(No 2) (Cth), regs 2018, online: Federal Register of Legislation <www.
legislation.gov.au/Details/F2018L01601> [perma.cc/L9S4-9GTP]; 
ACNC, “External Conduct Standards” (2019), online: ACNC <www.
acnc.gov.au/tools/topic-guides/external-conduct-standards>.
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being organized into social groups based on religious and political lines, 
known as ‘pillarization’.72 This fostered the growth and development of 
religiously and ideologically affiliated charitable organizations,73 which 
had strong relationships with the national government.74 In the second 
half of the 20th century, the pillarization weakened and Dutch citizens 
became involved with organizations that were not defined by religious or 
political affiliation.75 The growth of the welfare state resulted in increased 
public funding for charitable activities, both domestic and international, 
which solidified the centrality of charitable organizations in Dutch social 
and economic life.76 The concept of public benefit was first introduced in 
the Dutch tax legislation in 1917, when a tax exemption was introduced 
in the inheritance law.77 In 1952 a tax deduction for charitable gifts was 
introduced in the Dutch personal income tax for gifts to organizations 
that contributed to the public good78 and in 2012 specific categories of 
public benefit were enumerated in the tax laws, extending to charitable 
organizations located abroad.79 
i. Tax Incentives for Cross-Border Donations
A tax deduction is available to Dutch taxpayers who donate to an Algemeen 
Nut Beogende Instelling [Public Benefit Pursuing Entity (“PBPE”)], which 
has been registered as a charity under the Wet Inkomstenbelasting [Income 
72. See Gabi Spitz, Roeland Muskens & Edith van Ewijk, The Dutch 
and Development Cooperation: Ahead of the Crowd or Trailing Behind? 
(Amsterdam: National Committee For International Cooperation and 
Sustainable Development, 2013) at 10.
73. See Ary Burger et al, “The Netherlands: Key Features of the Dutch 
Nonprofit Sector” in Lester M Salamon et al, eds, Global Civil Society: 
Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for 
Civil Society Studies, 1999) 145 at 145-46.
74. See Spitz, Muskens & Van Ewijk, supra note 72 at 8.
75. Ibid at 10.
76. See Burger et al, supra note 73 at 146, 152.
77. Law of 20 January 1917, Dutch Official Gazette 189, concerning the 
Successiewet 1859 [Inheritance law 1859] (translation by the authors).
78. Law of 26 June 1952, Dutch Official Gazette 376. 
79. Algemene Wet Inzake Rijksbelastingen [General State Taxes Act] (The 
Netherlands) 1959, art 5b (translation by the authors) [GSTA].
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Tax Act 2001 (“ITA”)].80 The ITA distinguishes between periodic and 
other gifts.81 For periodic gifts, the donor commits to pay the same 
amount annually to a single PBPE over a period comprising at least five 
years and ultimately ending at the death of the taxpayer. These periodic 
gifts are fully deductible, up to 100 per cent of taxable gross income.82 
The remainder can be deducted in a subsequent year. Other gifts, defined 
as any gift that does not meet the requirements of a periodic gift, are tax 
deductible to the extent that the amount combined with other donations 
made during the taxable year exceeds a floor of EUR 60 and one per cent 
of taxable gross income. These gifts are capped at ten per cent of taxable 
gross income.83 
To qualify as a Dutch charity, the organization must register with 
the Dutch tax authority, Belastingdienst.84 Following the establishment of 
the non-discrimination principle by the ECJ, the Netherlands amended 
its tax legislation. In doing so, rather than limiting its charitable tax 
relief to European cross-border donations as mandated by the ECJ, the 
Netherlands went one step further by extending its tax relief to charities 
beyond Europe. The result is that charities in EU Member States or 
States designated by the Dutch Ministry of Finance85 can register as a 
80. Wet Inkomstenbelasting 2001 [Income Tax Act 2001] (The Netherlands), 
arts 6.32-6.33 (translation by the authors).
81. Ibid, arts 6.34-6.35. 
82. Ibid, arts 6.34, 6.38.
83. Ibid, art 6.39. 
84. GSTA, supra note 79.
85. These include countries with which the Netherlands has an agreement to 
exchange information on income tax and gift and inheritance tax, which 
may be in the form of a bilateral tax treaty, an agreement on exchange of 
tax information, or the Convention between the Member States of the 
Council of Europe and the Member Countries of the OECD on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. Even if a charity resides in a 
country that does not have an exchange of information agreement with 
the Netherlands, it can still register as a PBPE by agreeing to provide 
additional information to the Dutch tax authority. See GSTA, supra note 
79; Uitvoeringsregeling Algemene Wet Inzake Rijksbelastingen [Implementing 
Regulation General State Taxes Act] (The Netherlands) 1994, art 1c 
(translation by the authors).
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PBPE in the Netherlands. Upon receiving its Dutch charity status as 
a PBPE, the foreign charity is included in a list of charities that are 
eligible to receive tax deductible donations from Dutch taxpayers.86 Once 
registered as a Dutch charity, there are no geographic restrictions on the 
charity’s activities. Both resident and non-resident registered charities can 
undertake some or all of their activities outside the Netherlands. As of 1 
January 2018, there were 236 foreign charities registered as PBPEs in the 
Netherlands.87
Until recently, PBPEs could be used by Dutch donors as giving 
intermediaries to obtain a tax deduction for donations to charities 
that were not registered as a PBPE in the Netherlands, such as foreign 
charities or newly established domestic charities that had not yet obtained 
PBPE status. However, following a decree by the Ministry of Finance in 
201488 and a decision by the Dutch Supreme Court in 2016,89 the use of 
PBPEs serving as giving intermediaries has been significantly restricted. 
These restrictions were created in response to the perception that giving 
intermediaries were being used to maximise gift deductibility. Instead 
of making partially deductible other gifts to different charities over five 
consecutive years, Dutch donors were making a fully deductible periodic 
gift to a giving intermediary. Each year the giving intermediary would pass 
the gift to a different charity, as directed by the donor. To prevent donors 
86. See “Zoek een ANBI” [“Find an ANBI”], online: Belastingdienst <www.
belastingdienst.nl/rekenhulpen/giften/anbi_zoeken/> (translation by the 
authors).
87. “Kabinetsreactie Evaluaties Giftenaftrek en ANBI/SBBI-Regeling” 
[“Government Response to the Assessment of the Gift Deduction 
and ANBI/SBBI Regulation”] (2018), online: Rijksoverheid <www.
rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/04/26/kabinetsreactie-
evaluaties-giftenaftrek-en-anbi-sbbi-regeling> [perma.cc/6JZZ-ACVP] 
(translation by the authors).
88. Inkomstenbelating: Giften en Algemeen Nut Boegende Instellingen 
[Income Tax: Donations and Public Benefit Pursuing Entities], Decree 
of 19 December 2014, nr BLKB2014/1415M, (2014) Staatcourant 
[Government Gazette], nr 36877 (translation by the authors) [Decree]. 
89. Supreme Court 14/06262 (22 April 2016) ECLI:NL:HR:2016:695 (The 
Netherlands) [Supreme Court 14/026262].
132 
 
Silver & Buijze, Tax Incentives for Cross-Border Giving
from converting their other gifts into periodic gifts, in 2014 the Ministry 
of Finance decreed that a PBPE that functions as a conduit organization 
will lose its charitable status.90 Following this decree, the Dutch Supreme 
Court found that a facilitator of an online donation platform was not a 
PBPE on the basis that a PBPE should focus its activities on sufficiently 
defined aims that almost exclusively serve the public benefit.91 As a result, 
opportunities for Dutch donors to use a giving intermediary to obtain a 
tax deduction (whether directed domestically or abroad) are restricted. 
ii. Regulatory Measures Governing Cross-Border Charitable 
Activities
The Dutch tax legislation includes a number of registration requirements 
for any entity, domestic or foreign, seeking Dutch charity status. 
The main requirement is that at least 90 per cent of its activities are 
dedicated to pursuing the public benefit.92 Since January 2014, PBPEs 
are required to publish information annually on their website and to 
report this website to the Dutch tax authority.93 Foreign charities seeking 
Dutch charity status must submit an application form to the Dutch tax 
authority along with governing documents, tax status in the country 
of residence, financial statements and a list of board members.94 The 
Dutch tax authority may revoke charitable status if it determines that an 
organization’s activities are not being exercised in the public interest or 
90. Decree, supra note 88. 
91. Supreme Court 14/06262, supra note 89.
92. GSTA, supra note 79.
93. This includes a description of the organization’s aims, policy plan, 
financial statements, reimbursement policy and annual report. See 




94. “Aanvraag ANBI-Beschikking – Buitenland” [“Application PBPE-status – 
Foreign Countries”], online: Belastingdienst <belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/
connect/ bldcontentnl/themaoverstijgend/programmas_en_formulieren/
aanvraag_anbi_buitenland> [perma.cc/MNQ6-TAP2] (translation by the 
authors).
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other requirements are not met.95 
Ongoing monitoring of a number of registered charities is also 
conducted by the Central Bureau for Fundraising (“CBF”), an 
independent accrediting and oversight agency, providing its member 
organizations with greater credibility.96 Charities apply to the CBF for a 
‘seal of approval’, which involves the CBF conducting an assessment of 
the organization’s records and information against a number of criteria 
and subsequent annual assessments to ensure ongoing compliance.97 
While the CBF’s seal of approval has no legal consequences, it nonetheless 
serves as an important charitable monitoring body given that the charities 
under its supervision account for approximately 85 per cent of all funds 
raised in the Netherlands including all international Non-Governmental 
Organizations (“NGOs”).98 The Dutch tax authorities and the CBF have 
signed an agreement on the incorporation of the PBPE requirements in 
the CBF’s assessment.99 
B. Identification of Similarities and Differences
Australia and the Netherlands offer contrasting approaches to the tax 
treatment of cross-border donations as a result of the particular local 
context in which each country’s charitable tax regime operates. Australia’s 
approach is based on the English common law definition of charity, 
codified in its charity laws, with regulation occurring primarily through 
its national charity regulator. The Netherlands has codified its tax laws, 
with regulation mainly undertaken by the Dutch tax authority. The 
95. GSTA, supra note 79, s 7. 
96. Financial Action Tax Force, “Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism – The 
Netherlands” (25 February 2011) at 262.
97. Ibid at 264.
98. Ibid.
99. CBF Toezichthouder Goede Doelen, “Goededoelensector en 
Belastingdienst Ondertekenen Convenant” [CBF Supervisor Charitable 
Organisations, “Charities and Tax Authorities Sign Agreement”] (29 
June 2018), online: CBF Nieuwsoverzicht <www.cbf.nl/nieuwsbericht/
goededoelensector-en-belastingdienst-ondertekenen-convenant> [perma.
cc/XCZ2-QDWM] (translation by the authors). 
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differences in approaches undertaken by the two countries are further 
illuminated through the thematic bases for comparison.
1. Tax Incentives for Cross-Border Donations
The comparative analysis revealed that there is policy consistency across 
the two jurisdictions in encouraging domestic giving through the tax laws. 
Each country, however, has responded differently to concerns relating 
to the fiscal consequences of extending tax concessions to cross-border 
donations and the supervision of philanthropy outside their jurisdiction. 
In Australia, the residency requirement does not permit a deduction 
for donations made directly to foreign charities, consistent with Australia’s 
colonial origins of welfare provision combined with private charity that 
focused on domestic causes. This restrictive approach to charity was 
incorporated into Australia’s tax laws, resulting in a narrow concept 
of public benefit limited to organizations ‘in Australia’. The ATO’s 
longstanding interpretation of the ‘in Australia’ residency requirement has 
not permitted a tax deduction for donations to domestic charities that are 
spent abroad, unless such activities are relatively minor or incidental to 
their Australian operations or unless the organization obtained its DGR 
status pursuant to one of the exceptions to the ‘in Australia’ requirement. 
In contrast, since 2008 the Netherlands, in line with the EU treaties, 
has provided equal tax treatment of domestic and foreign charities that 
register with the Dutch tax authority. This allows Dutch donors to claim 
a deduction for donations made directly to foreign charities, provided 
they have registered as PBPEs. The Netherlands has incorporated this 
permissive approach into its tax laws, extending the concept of public 
benefit to charitable activities carried out abroad. As a result, domestic 
charities are able to use tax deductible donations for their international 
charitable activities. 
The Australian tax laws applying to cross-border giving and (until 
recently) their restrictive interpretation by the ATO, have provided strong 
incentives for charities and donors wishing to obtain charitable tax relief 
to direct their charitable activities and funds domestically. This restrictive 
approach also revealed the limited options available to Australian donors 
who wished to engage in tax effective cross-border giving, as well as the 
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difficulties Australian charities reliant on these donations experienced 
in operating abroad. As a consequence, organizations and their donors 
have been making tax deductible donations indirectly, through domestic 
giving intermediaries as workarounds of the tax laws. In contrast, in the 
Netherlands both the Dutch Government and the courts have indicated 
they are limiting the use of domestic giving intermediaries. This does not 
affect the ability of Dutch donors to make tax effective donations abroad, 
as they can still obtain a tax deduction on a cross-border donation 
made directly to a foreign charity provided it is recognized as a PBPE, 
or to a domestic charity that operates internationally. However, it has 
implications for foreign charities that have not registered with the Dutch 
tax authority as a PBPE, as Dutch donors can no longer use a giving 
intermediary to make tax deductible donations to such charities.
2. Regulatory Measures Governing Cross-Border 
Charitable Activities
Both countries have tools to regulate international giving for donations 
made to foreign charities, responding to the need for government 
oversight of cross-border giving. Australia has registration and reporting 
requirements for charities generally, including compliance with the 
ACNC’s governance standards and provision of annual information 
statements. To date these regulatory requirements have not been 
particularly focused on international charitable activities, although that 
is likely to change with the recent introduction of the ACNC’s external 
conduct standards. In the Netherlands there are also registration and 
reporting requirements applying to both domestic and foreign charities. 
These processes enable the Dutch tax authority to have a measure of 
control over foreign charities and the funds entrusted to them. While 
this regulation may increase the administrative burdens and costs for 
foreign charities potentially creating disincentives for registration,100 it 
appears to be a more targeted regulatory tool for government to monitor 
international charitable activities.
100. See Hemels, supra note 13 at 431.
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C. Evaluation
To evaluate which of the two divergent approaches to the tax treatment 
of international giving is more optimal, we employ five tax policy criteria: 
efficiency, equity, simplicity, policy consistency and sustainability. Across 
jurisdictions there is general consensus that a country’s “tax laws should be 
fair, economically efficient and simple to comply with and administer”.101 
Additional concerns of sustainability and policy consistency are often 
used to evaluate tax laws and systems.102 An optimal approach to the tax 
treatment of cross-border donations would seek to maintain a delicate 
balance between these oft-competing policy considerations. 
1. Efficiency
Treasury, or economic, efficiency is concerned with whether the tax 
deduction is a cost effective way to subsidize charitable organizations by 
measuring the extent to which the deduction delivers social benefits (in 
the form of donations) that exceed the costs of the lost tax revenue.103 On 
a granular level, treasury efficiency is concerned with whether a dollar of 
forgone taxes induces at least an extra dollar of donations. If each dollar 
of forgone revenue purchases less than one dollar of giving, arguably 
the subsidy should be removed and replaced with direct spending.104 
The extent to which the tax deduction succeeds in encouraging giving 
depends on how responsive donors are to price incentives, measured by 
101. See Michael Graetz, “Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking” (1995) 95:3 
Columbia Law Review 609 at 609.
102. See e.g. UK, HC Treasury Committee, Principles of Tax Policy: Eighth 
Report of Session 2010-11, vol 1 (15 March 2011) [Treasury Committee]; 
Austl, Commonwealth, Australia’s Future Tax System Review Panel, 
Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer (Canberra: Australian 
Government Treasury, 2009) [Australia’s Future Tax System Review].
103. See Rob Reich, “Toward a Political Theory of Philanthropy” in Patricia 
Illingworth, Thomas Pogge & Leif Wenar, eds, Giving Well: The Ethics of 
Philanthropy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 177 at 182-83.
104. See Colinvaux, Galle & Steuerle, supra note 3 at 8 (noting that transaction 
costs, such as fundraising and the costs of grants and direct expenditures 
would also have to be taken into account).
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economists as the price elasticity of giving. For taxpayers for whom giving 
is price elastic, lowering the price of giving through tax incentives can 
potentially increase the amount donated and the number of individuals 
donating.105 Conversely, low price elasticities suggest that tax incentives 
are an inefficient means of funding nonprofit organizations. Since the 
1970s, the effects of tax incentives on charitable contributions have been 
studied extensively. A review of these studies in the US suggests that giving 
is price elastic, at least among individuals with high incomes.106 These 
findings suggest that the gift deduction is an efficient way to subsidize 
charitable organizations. The higher top marginal tax rates in Australia 
and the Netherlands compared to the US implies that the gift deduction 
would have a larger impact on giving in these countries, particularly for 
wealthy taxpayers.107
While there have been no studies estimating price elasticities of cross-
border philanthropy, a comparative study of private charitable giving to 
developing countries conducted by the Center for Global Development 
concluded that “[c]itizens in countries with stronger targeted income 
105. See Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 3.
106. See John List, “The Market for Charitable Giving” (2011) 25:2 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 157. See also John Peloza & Piers Steel, “The Price 
Elasticities of Charitable Contributions: A Meta-Analysis” (2005) 24:2 
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 260, which shows a price elasticity 
of giving between -1.11 and -1.44. 
107. See Austl, Commonwealth, Productivity Commission, Contribution of 
the Not-for-Profit Sector (Canberra: Australian Government Productivity 
Commission, 2010) at 174; Myles McGregor-Lowndes & Marie 
Crittall, “An Examination of Tax Deductible Donations Made By 
Individual Australian Taxpayers in 2012–13” (2015) Australian Centre 
for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, Queensland University of 
Technology Working Paper No 66 at 7, 61. In the 2019 Dutch Tax Plan 
it was announced that from 2020 the tax rate against which donations can 
be deducted in the Netherlands will reduce gradually, from the highest 
tax bracket to 37.05 per cent in 2023. See Belastingplan 2019 [Dutch Tax 
Plan 2019] (Dutch Ministry of Finance, 18 September 2018).
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tax incentives appear to give more private charity to poor countries”.108 
This finding indicates a high price elasticity for taxpayers who give to 
developing countries, suggesting that the gift deduction may also be a 
cost-effective way to subsidize international charitable activities. Whether 
or not this increases treasury efficiency, however, depends on the larger 
social aims of the deduction and the reach of the social benefits it delivers. 
In an era of philanthropic globalization, an optimal approach to the tax 
treatment of cross-border donations would take a broad perspective of 
treasury efficiency. If this view is adopted, the permissive approach of 
the Netherlands means that the social benefits the deduction delivers 
extends globally. As a result, the deduction for cross-border donations 
could be considered treasury efficient in its cost-effective delivery of 
support abroad. In contrast, in Australia where traditionally “the fiscal 
state generally does not recognise or facilitate [the] growth in global 
charity”,109 the social benefits of the deduction have been largely confined 
to beneficiaries within Australia’s borders. While this may be treasury 
efficient in the narrower sense of limiting the consequences for national 
revenue, it is not cost effective for the increasing amount of Australian 
donations being directed abroad.110
2. Equity
Equity is concerned with the concepts of “similar treatment of people 
similarly situated” (horizontal equity) and “fairness of the distribution 
of taxes at different levels of income, consumption, or wealth” (vertical 
equity).111 The gift deduction is particularly problematic with respect to 
108. See David Roodman & Scott Standley, “Tax Policies to Promote Private 
Charitable Giving in DAC Countries” (2006) Center for Global 
Development Working Paper No 82 at 35. 
109. See Stewart, supra note 13 at 244. 
110. The most recent data shows that almost 20 per cent of total donations 
are directed internationally, representing AUD $2.1 billion. See Myles 
McGregor-Lowndes et al, Giving Australia 2016: Individual Giving and 
Volunteering (The Australian Centre for Nonprofit Studies, Centre for 
Social Impact Swinburne and Centre for Corporate Public Affairs 2017) 
at 32. 
111. Graetz, supra note 101 at 610. 
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vertical equity and is subject to ‘powerful criticisms’ that relate to the 
fair treatment of donors.112 This is due to its ‘upside down effect’ in a 
system of progressive taxation, whereby the government’s contribution is 
tied to a donor’s marginal tax rate.113 The result of this system is that the 
wealthier the donor, the less a charitable gift costs. Given that wealthy 
taxpayers have the resources to make larger donations than lower income 
taxpayers, they are already able to allocate more of the tax subsidy. The 
upside-down effect of the deduction compounds this inequity.114 With 
evidence of a high price elasticity for wealthy taxpayers, when cross-
border donations are introduced into the analysis the question becomes 
whether income has a significant effect on the likelihood of giving abroad. 
Empirical studies from around the world profiling donors who engage in 
cross-border philanthropy suggest that this is not the case.115 Instead the 
characteristics most strongly related to private international giving are 
112. Reich, supra note 103 at 182. 
113. See Richard Krever, “Tax Deductions for Charitable Donations: A Tax 
Expenditure Analysis” in Richard Krever and Gretchen Kewley, eds, 
Charities and Philanthropic Institutions: Reforming the Tax Subsidy and 
Regulatory Regimes (Wellington: Comparative Public Policy Research 
Unit, Monash University, 1991) at 19-20; Mark Gergen, “The Case for a 
Charitable Contributions Deduction” (1988) 74:8 Virginia Law Review 
1391 at 1405. 
114. Krever, ibid at 20. The Dutch Government’s recent announcement of a 
reduction in the tax rate against which gifts may be deducted will resolve 
the upside-down effect of the charitable tax deduction in the Netherlands. 
See Dutch Tax Plan 2019, supra note 107.
115. See e.g. Daniela Casale & Anna Baumann, “Who Gives to International 
Causes? A Sociodemographic Analysis of US Donors” (2015) 44:1 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 98 at 117; John Micklewright 
& Sylke Schnepf, “Who Gives Charitable Donations for Overseas 
Development?” (2009) 38:2 Journal of Social Policy 317 at 335; Suja 
Rajan, George Pink & William Dow, “Sociodemographic and Personality 
Characteristics of Canadian Donors Contributing to International 
Charity” (2009) 38:3 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 413 
at 435-36; and Pamala Wiepking, “Democrats Support International 
Relief and the Upper Class Donates to Art? How Opportunity, Incentives 
and Confidence Affect Donations to Different Types of Charitable 
Organisations” (2010) 39:6 Social Science Research 1073 at 1081. 
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higher education, being religious and being foreign-born.116 As a result 
of these findings, permitting a deduction for cross-border charitable gifts 
would have a neutral effect on vertical inequity. 
For domestic donations, the gift deduction has not been subject to 
criticism on horizontal equity grounds because taxpayers in the same tax 
bracket are treated similarly. When international giving is introduced into 
the analysis, at first glance it appears that horizontal equity is maintained 
because taxpayers in a particular tax bracket are subject to the same tax 
treatment whether they give domestically or internationally. However, it 
is arguable that the unequal tax treatment of domestic and cross-border 
donations does have an impact on taxpayers in the same tax brackets 
if the gift deduction is only available for donors in that bracket who 
choose to give domestically, but not for those who choose to give abroad. 
An optimal approach to the tax treatment of cross-border donations 
would ensure that horizontal equity is maintained by providing equal 
tax treatment for domestic and international gifts. The approach taken 
in the Netherlands conforms to this horizontal equity ideal. First, the 
Netherlands permits foreign charities to register with the Dutch tax 
authority, such that donations made by Dutch taxpayers in the same tax 
bracket to these foreign charities will be treated the same as donations 
made to domestic charities. That is, the Dutch tax authority does not 
distinguish between domestic and foreign PBPEs for tax purposes. 
Second, the Netherlands allows donations to domestic charities that 
operate abroad to be tax deductible for Dutch taxpayers in the same 
tax bracket whether or not the funds are directed to beneficiaries in the 
Netherlands. Third, the Netherlands limits the use of charitable giving 
intermediaries, for both domestically-targeted and internationally-
targeted donations. In contrast, the ‘in Australia’ residency requirement 
for DGRs decreases horizontal equity domestically with respect to cross-
border donations because taxpayers at the highest tax rate of 49 per cent 
who give to organizations engaged in domestic charitable activities each 
pay 51 cents after tax for each dollar donated, while those who donate 
116. See Casale & Baumann, ibid; Micklewright & Schnepf, ibid; Rajan, Pink 
& Dow, ibid.
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to organizations operating abroad that do not fall under an ‘in Australia’ 
exception each pay a dollar. 
Equity considerations can also be considered from a broader, global 
perspective. When the global impact of permitting the deduction for 
cross-border donations is taken into account it may reduce inequities 
associated with the deduction, provided these donations flow from 
wealthier countries to poorer countries as ‘private’ foreign aid. The 
vast majority of private international giving is channeled to developing 
countries through relief and development NGOs.117 As charitable funds 
are redistributed from developed to developing countries they have the 
potential to influence the inequitable global allocation of resources.118 
The Netherlands’ permissive approach to cross-border giving promotes 
this redistributive effect of the gift deduction. In contrast, the Australian 
approach, while acknowledging the redistributive effect of private giving 
to international relief and development organizations through the 
international aid exception to the ‘in Australia’ residency requirement, 
has placed significant barriers to entry for organizations seeking to 
qualify for DGR status under this exception. The result is that Australia 
has not been able to utilize the gift deduction as a tool for reducing global 
inequities to the same extent as the Netherlands.
3. Simplicity
Tax rules should aim to be simple in the sense that they are clear in their 
objectives, able to be understood by taxpayers and capable of efficient 
implementation by administrators.119 An optimal approach to the tax 
treatment of cross-border donations would reduce complexity by ensuring 
117. See Roodman & Standley, supra note 108 at 5-6, (noting that 70 per 
cent of DAC private aid goes to ‘Part I’ countries, which includes most 
economies typically categorized as ‘developing countries’, nearly all of 
whom fall below the World Bank’s threshold for ‘high-income country’ 
and are generally considered to be the poorest recipients). 
118. See David Pozen, “Remapping the Charitable Deduction” (2006) 39:2 
Connecticut Law Review 531 at 583 [Pozen, “Remapping Charitable 
Deduction”]. 
119. See Treasury Committee, supra note 102 at 28.
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that the laws and procedures applying to cross-border giving are clear and 
unambiguous.120 Complexity is further reduced by providing certainty 
for foreign charities and their donors and by providing the government 
with a cost effective means of ensuring that the tax expenditure is being 
used for its intended purposes. 
In Australia, the complex legislative architecture governing the 
tax treatment of cross-border donations is far from clear. The meaning 
of ‘in Australia’ was never stated in the tax legislation and required 
interpretation by the ATO. The ATO’s longstanding restrictive 
interpretation of the ‘in Australia’ residency requirement combined 
with the special exceptions contained in the legislation has produced 
considerable complexity for organizations and their donors seeking to 
engage in cross-border charitable activities. Ambiguities also exist as to 
whether donations to an Australian DGR that re-donates the funds to a 
charitable organization operating outside Australia are tax deductible.121 
As a result, Australian charities and their donors have used workarounds 
to circumvent the tax laws to facilitate tax-effective cross-border giving. 
Ironically, this legal circumvention has made monitoring cross-border 
donations more difficult for the Australian authorities operating within 
a regulatory regime with overlapping supervisory functions. The result is 
a complicated and costly system for organizations operating abroad and 
their donors, who are faced with legal and regulatory requirements that 
on the one hand are quite restrictive, while on the other are able to be 
bypassed for a price. 
In the Netherlands, the tax treatment of cross-border donations is less 
ambiguous and there is greater procedural clarity governing international 
philanthropy. This is reflected in the ability of foreign charities to 
register as a PBPE, after which they are subject to the same legal and 
regulatory requirements as Dutch charities. Centralized regulation for 
registered PBPEs with the Dutch tax authorities simplifies oversight 
and monitoring. Because registration as a PBPE means that there are 
120. See Harvey Dale, “Foreign Charities” (1995) 48:3 The Tax Lawyer 655 at 
696.
121. Word Investments, supra note 56; Hunger Project, supra note 57.
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no geographic restrictions on the charity’s activities, both domestic and 
foreign registered charities can undertake some or all of their activities 
outside the Netherlands. This legal and procedural clarity provides 
relative certainty for Dutch donors seeking a tax deduction for gifts 
directed abroad through these registered domestic and foreign charities. 
In doing so, it alleviates the need for workarounds when Dutch taxpayers 
donate to a registered Dutch charity which operates abroad or to a foreign 
charity that is registered as a PBPE. While there has previously been 
some uncertainty concerning the ability of a Dutch donor to make a tax 
deductible donation to a foreign charity that is not registered as a PBPE 
through a domestic charity serving as a giving intermediary, the recent 
government decree and Supreme Court of the Netherlands decision on 
this issue have clearly restricted the use of giving intermediaries to send 
tax deductible donations abroad.122 
4. Policy Consistency
Tax rules should be consistent with broader government policy objectives. 
This is “particularly relevant when assessing the role of tax expenditures, 
since the justification for many of them lies in other economic and social 
policy objectives”.123 Determining whether the gift deduction is consistent 
with broader government policy objectives involves considering the policy 
reasons for the existing state of affairs.124 The policy underlying the gift 
deduction is to encourage philanthropic giving to provide support for 
the production and delivery of public goods and services. By attracting 
philanthropic funding, nonprofits are able to produce and deliver more 
of these public goods and services, generating external benefits to the 
122. Decree, supra note 88; Supreme Court 14/06262, supra note 89.
123. See Australia’s Future Tax System Review, supra note 102 at 206, 728.
124. See Myles McGregor-Lowndes, Matthew Turnour & Elizabeth Turnour, 
“Not-for-Profit Income Tax Exemption: Is There a Hole in the Bucket, 
Dear Henry?” (2011) 26:4 Australian Tax Forum 601 at 626. 
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wider society in which they operate.125 
This raises the question of whether public goods should be for the 
benefit of the domestic population or extend to the wider international 
community. The concept of public benefit found in the common law 
is informative. In the UK and Australia, the courts have upheld trusts 
covering a wide range of charitable purposes to be carried out abroad, 
provided that they do not contravene policy in the home jurisdiction.126 
The Charity Commission of England and Wales has taken the position 
that “[a] purpose may be charitable even if all its potential beneficiaries 
are outside England and Wales”.127 In Australia, the Inquiry into the 
Definition of Charities and Related Organisations found that “public 
benefit is a universal concept and cannot be contained within the 
boundaries of any country”.128 The universal concept of public benefit 
developed in charity law suggests that the ‘public’ who should ‘benefit’ 
125. See Burton Weisbrod, “Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit 
Sector in a Three-Sector Economy” in Edmund Phelps, ed, Altruism, 
Morality and Economic Theory (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975) 
at 171-95. 
126. In the UK, see e.g. Re Vagliano, (1905) 75 LJ Ch 119 (Eng); Re Redish, 
(1909) 26 TLR 42 (Ch (Eng)); Re Robinson, [1931] 2 Ch 122 (Eng); Re 
Jacobs, (1970) 114 SJ 515 (Ch (Eng)); Re Niyazi’s Will Trusts, [1978] 1 
WLR 910 (Ch (Eng)); Human Dignity Trust v The Charity Commission 
for England and Wales, [2014] UKFTT 2013_0013 (GRC). In Australia, 
see e.g. Re Pieper, [1951] VLR 42 (SC (Austl)); Kytherian Association 
of Queensland v Sklavos, (1958) 101 CLR 56 (HCA); Re Lowin [1967] 
2 NSWR 140 (CA (Austl)); Re Stone (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 704 (SC 
(Austl)); McGrath v Cohen [1978] 1 NSWLR 621 (SC (Austl)); Lander v 
Whitbread, [1982] 2 NSWLR 530 (SC (Austl)); Goldwyn v Mazal, [2003] 
NSWSC 427 (Austl). 
127. UK, Charity Commission of England and Wales, Analysis of the Law 
Relating to Public Benefit (September 2013), online (pdf ): Gov.uk 
<assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment _data/file/589796/Public_benefit_analysis_of_the_law.pdf> at 
para 74.
128. See Ian Sheppard, Robert Fitzgerald & David Gonski, Report of the 
Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations 
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001) 257. 
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from charity extends beyond national borders.129 It follows that an 
optimal approach to the tax treatment of cross-border donations that 
is consistent with the policy objective of encouraging philanthropic 
giving to provide support for the production and delivery of public 
goods would be permissive. The Netherlands satisfies this public benefit 
policy objective by permitting indirect support of the charitable purposes 
enumerated in the tax legislation through the tax deduction regardless 
of where the purpose is fulfilled geographically. This approach is also 
consistent with broader supranational agreements between EU Member 
States concerning the free movement of goods, citizens, services and 
capital and the recent opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee.130 
Tax deductibility for cross-border donations also implicates 
support for foreign policy objectives, such as development aid and 
disaster relief. Because governments can influence the level of private 
philanthropy through domestic tax policy, a policy promoting private 
cross-border giving can be considered support for these foreign policy 
objectives.131 Studies have shown that private international giving to 
developing countries and official government aid are complements 
rather than substitutes.132 Indeed, one legal scholar has described the 
charitable deduction in the US as “the most significant foreign aid tax 
129. See Pozen, “Remapping Charitable Deduction”, supra note 118 at 531, 
568; Stewart, supra note 13 at 251; Jonathan Garton, Public Benefit in 
Charity Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 55-56; Gino Evan 
Dal Pont, Law of Charity (Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2010) at 75-76.
130. See TFEU, supra note 7; “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European 
Union” (1 March 2020), EUR-Lex, online: <https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02016M/TXT-20200301>; 
European Economic and Social Committee, supra note 10. 
131. See Roodman & Standley, supra note 108 at 10, 35. 
132. Ibid at 35 (noting that private international giving and government aid 
have a “strong positive relationship”); Rajan, Pink & Dow, supra note 115 
at 415 (noting that empirical studies show that government aid does not 
crowd out private donations). 
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expenditure”.133 Similarly, tax deductibility for cross-border donations can 
also serve as a complementary measure to direct government subsidies to 
tackle transnational policy objectives, such as environmental protection 
and the prevention of terrorism.134
5. Sustainability
Tax rules should be considered in light of revenue sustainability, in the 
sense that they need to be affordable over the long term.135 Governments 
are concerned with protecting the public purse from unintended 
consequences of the charitable tax concessions.136 An optimal approach to 
the tax treatment of cross-border donations would ensure that countries 
minimize the costs to the public purse of taxpayer subsidized funds being 
sent abroad, while ensuring the tax expenditure is used for its intended 
purpose. 
Australia and the Netherlands both have a charitable funding system 
in which donations by individuals will trigger a consequent government 
contribution indirectly to the donor in the form of a tax deduction. The 
fiscal consequences of the tax deduction are measured in each country’s 
tax expenditure statement. Table 1 below shows the revenue impact of 
the charitable tax deduction in each jurisdiction. This data is obtained 
from the line item in each country’s tax expenditure statement on tax 
concessions for charitable donations, with the caveat that international 
133. See David Pozen, “Tax Expenditures as Foreign Aid” (2007) 116:5 Yale 
Law Journal 869 at 874. 
134. See Pozen, “Remapping Charitable Deduction”, supra note 118 at 580. 
135. See Australia’s Future Tax System Review, supra note 102 at 727.
136. See Susan Phillips & Steven Rathgeb Smith, “Between Governance and 
Regulation: Evolving Government-Third Sector Relationships”, in Susan 
Phillips & Steven Rathgeb Smith, eds, Governance and Regulation in the 
Third Sector: International Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2011).
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(USD 2017) per 
inhabitant6
Netherlands1 EUR 0.363 0.41 24
Australia2 AUD 1.204 0.94 38
Table 1: Revenue impact of charitable tax incentives
Table 1 Notes
1. Persoonsgebonden Aftrek - Giftenaftrek Inkomstenbelasting [Personal 
Allowances – Deduction of Charitable Donations] (translation by the 
authors).
2  Deduction for gifts to DGRs.
3  Estimation for the calendar year 2017. Source: Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal [House of Representatives of the Dutch Parliament], “Fiscale 
Regelingen” [“Fiscal Arrangements”], Nota over de Toestand van’s Rijks 
Financiën: Vergaderjaar 2017–18 [Notes on the Government’ Finances: Year 
2017-18] 34 775, No 2 (19 September 2017) at table 6.3.1 (translation 
by the authors).
4  For the fiscal year 2016-17. Source: Australian Treasury, Tax Expenditures 
Statement 2017 (January 2018) at 43, item A57.
5  USD comparison of the first column based on 2017 exchange rates. 
6  USD comparison of the second column based on 2017 population. 
 While Table 1 does not disaggregate tax expenditures for cross-border 
giving, it is notable that the responsiveness of the Netherlands towards 
international philanthropy —providing equal tax treatment for 
domestic and cross-border donations — appears to have had limited 
revenue impact. This is surprising given that the Netherlands currently 
has some of the highest marginal income tax rates in the world. This 
137. See OECD, Tax Policy Studies, Choosing a Broad Base – Low Rate 
Approach to Taxation, No 19 (2010) at 115 (“Tax expenditure definitions 
differ across countries due to differences in the definition of their 
benchmark tax systems. Factors that have an impact on the choice 
between a broad base and use of tax expenditures include own country’s 
preferences regarding income redistribution, the strength of its tax 
administration and its revenue requirements. Most, if not all, of these 
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finding indicates that there are factors other than tax incentives that 
also influence individual philanthropic behaviour, including the level of 
government support provided to nonprofits; the extent of regulation of 
the nonprofit sector; and culture, particularly religion and fundraising 
professionalism.138 It also suggests that fears of fiscal consequences from 
allowing a deduction for cross-border gifts cannot be substantiated 
solely by tax incentives. To more accurately measure the impact of this 
permissive approach on the public purse, further empirical research on 
the taxes foregone as a result of tax incentives for cross-border donations 
would be necessary.
Any calculation of the cost to the public purse of the deduction for cross-
border gifts also needs to consider the return in the form of benefits that 
the government receives for the public funds expended. If a global view 
of the impact of the deduction is taken “there is a plausible case to be 
made that net social welfare will be greater in a tax system with more 
generous international deductions”.139 Consistent with a broad concept 
of public benefit, cross-border gifts that fund organizations involved in 
the production of global public goods such as scientific innovations, 
conflict resolution and artistic collaborations and in the development 
of solutions for global challenges such as climate change and infectious 
diseases, can provide benefits to citizens in the donor country. As a result, 
a permissive approach that further supports the provision of global 
public goods is likely to result in government savings that may not be 
immediately apparent, but that will have a significant impact on revenue 
sustainability in the long term. 
V. Conclusion
The development of a spectrum of approaches to the tax treatment of 
cross-border donations reveals that the current legal and regulatory 
environment in which cross-border giving operates around the world 
emphasizes government regulation combined with a desire from donors 
to engage in tax-effective international philanthropy. Adopting a policy 
138. See Pamala Wiepking & Famida Handy, “Explanations for Cross-National 
Differences in Philanthropy” in Pamala Wiepking & Famida Handy, 
eds, The Palgrave Handbook for Global Philanthropy (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015) at 9.
139. See Pozen, “Remapping Charitable Deduction”, supra note 118 at 580.
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framework for reforming the tax and regulatory regime governing cross-
border giving requires an approach that is responsive to this changed 
philanthropic landscape. An evaluation of the divergent approaches 
of Australia and the Netherlands reaches an unequivocal conclusion; 
the permissive approach of the Netherlands is optimal in an era of 
philanthropic globalization when measured against each of the tax policy 
considerations. 
The Netherlands has responded to case law of the ECJ and a changed 
regional philanthropic landscape by delivering an ‘equivalency ideal’140 
whereby cross-border donations are subject to the same tax treatment 
as domestic donations, achieving horizontal equity. This approach also 
promotes economic efficiency in the broad sense as a cost-effective way 
to subsidize international charitable activities and ultimately contributes 
to a reduction in global inequities due to the redistributive effect on the 
global allocation of resources. The Netherlands’ approach also reduces 
complexity with legislative clarity and straightforward registration 
procedures. This permissive approach complements Dutch foreign policy 
objectives by enhancing the Netherlands’ delivery of international aid. 
It is also consistent with broader regional agreements. The Dutch tax 
expenditure statement when compared with Australia’s shows that the 
impact of this approach on revenue sustainability appears to be minimal, 
particularly when the benefits to Dutch citizens and the wider global 
community of investing in the production of global public goods are 
considered. 
In contrast to the Dutch approach, the legislative architecture in 
Australia has created a particularly complex legal and regulatory regime 
for cross-border charity. The Australian Government’s longstanding 
approach has been to prioritize fiscal consequences over the need to 
balance other tax policy considerations, resulting in the reduced capacity 
of the traditional normative concerns of taxation to influence policy-
making with respect to the tax treatment of cross-border donations. 
Ironically, instead of ensuring that the benefits of these charitable tax 
subsidies remain in Australia, the Government’s restrictive approach has 
140. Ibid at 594. 
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enabled largely unregulated tax deductible cross-border giving to take 
place through giving intermediaries. 
The Australian Government’s recently announced reform proposals 
to simplify the regulatory regime governing international charity and the 
ATO’s new tax ruling on the ‘in Australia’ residency requirement reflect 
a shift to a more permissive approach to tax incentives for cross-border 
philanthropy. This represents an acknowledgment by the Australian 
Government that its longstanding restrictive approach is not working in 
a changed environment for international giving, reinforcing the findings 
of the comparative analysis. The convergence of the Australian approach 
towards the Dutch position on the spectrum signifies that Australia is 
now moving towards a more optimal policy response to this issue. Policy-
makers in other jurisdictions may also recognize that their current legal 
regime governing cross-border philanthropy is not adequately addressing 
the challenges posed by a changed global philanthropic landscape. The 
comparative analysis undertaken in this article illuminates the path 
forward for reform.
